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Technology innovation is the main driving force to promote economic development and social progress,while R&D innovation is the key link of technology innovation.For firm,R&D innovation is an important component of competitive strategy,which can improve the operating conditions of the market,have market power and access to monopoly profits.The network externality in an industry is that the benefit that consumers enjoy from purchasing one or several of its goods depends on the number of other consumers that use the same or compatible goods.The industries exhibiting network externality are usually some high -tech industries,such as the computer industries,the telecommunication industries,the consumer electronic industries,and so on.In these industries,R&D innovation is more active and product updates more frequently than industries without network externality.Therefore,to study the R&D innovation strategy of competitive firms is a very important issue in industries with network externality.Based on this,the book uses game theory to research R&D competitive strategies in the market with network externality.1.The game model of R&D innovation under uncertainty based on horizontally differentiated model.In this part,product innovation is aimed at increasing reservation price.As we all know,the final outcome is generally uncertain when firm implements a R&D project.Assumed R&D innovation under uncertainty and the market fully covered,this part investigates duopoly firms’R&D competitive strategies by a variant Hotelling model.The main findings are as follows.First,when two firms’marginal costs are equal,the equilibrium R&D efforts are only depend on the spillover and R&D cost parameters,but when two firms’marginalcostsdiffer,theyarealsoaffectedbynetworkexternalityand compatibility.Second,when firms’products are partially compatible,the probability that expected profit increases with R&D risk will increase with network intensity.Third,the aggregate equilibrium R&D level is smaller than the social optimum.Finally,firm’s process innovation and its product innovation aimed at increasing reservation price complements.Moreover,the intensity of complementarity between R&D innovations increases with network intensity.2.The game model of R&D innovation under uncertainty based on representative consumer model.As we all know,the market is not always fully covered.Though assuming the market partially covered,this model studies firm’s R&D competitive strategies by a variant representative consumer model.The main conclusions are as follows.First,when the marginal costs are same,firms’equilibrium R&D efforts affected by network externality(or spillover effect and compatibility)are same.But when the marginal costs differ,firms’equilibrium R&D efforts affected by network intensity(or spillover effect and compatibility)may differ.Second,aggregate equilibrium R&D level may be bigger(or smaller)than social optimum.Third,when compatibility is small enough,the probability that firms invest too much than social optimum increases with network intensity.Finally,when not consider R&D spillover,firm’s process innovation and its product innovation aimed at increasing reservation price are complements and the intensity of complementarity between R&D innovations increases with network intensity.3.The game model of horizontal product innovation.When a R&D innovation is aimed at increasing the degree of differentiation among goods,we call it horizontal product innovation.This part investigates the R&D competitive strategies when duopoly firms implement horizontal product innovation.The main results are as follows.First,the firm with low marginal cost investing more than the one with high marginal cost may happen only when the market exhibits network externality.Second,equilibrium product innovation efforts increase with network strength or compatibility when firms’marginal costs are equal,but equilibrium product innovation effort of the firm with low marginal cost may decrease with network intensity when firms’marginal costs differ.Third,aggregate equilibrium productinnovation effortis smaller than social optimum.Finally,both firms’process innovation can reduce their horizontal product innovation,but horizontal product innovation improving or reducing their process innovation depends on network externality,compatibility and aggregate efforts of product innovation.4.The game model of process and product innovation based on vertically differentiated model.In this part,product innovation is aimed at improving product quality(or call vertical product innovation).We research the R&D competitive strategies when two firms’qualities differ and each firm carries both process innovation and vertical product innovation.The studies show that the R&D competitive strategies and how network externality affects R&D decisions depend on the cover degree of market,the sequence of different innovations and the form of product innovation cost. Keywords:R&D;network externality;product innovation;process innovation;game theory;spillover effect;compatibility
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第一章 绪论第一节 研究背景和意义
第二节 文献综述一 传统研发创新理论及研究现状(一)研发溢出效应
(二)研发不确定性
(三)水平产品创新
(四)研发创新间关系
二 网络外部性的研究(一)网络外部性和兼容性
(二)网络外部性理论研究现状
三 基于网络外部性的研发创新研究(一)已有理论研究现状
(二)已有研究不足之处
四 博弈论及均衡稳定性
第三节 本书结构
第四节 主要创新点
第二章 基于水平差异化模型的不确定研发研究第一节 引言
第二节 增加保留价格型产品创新模型一 模型假设
二 模型求解
三 均衡比较静态分析
四 社会最优研发策略(一)期望社会福利函数
(二)社会最优研发策略
五 私人最优和社会最优比较
第三节 工序创新对增加保留价格型产品创新的影响一 模型假设
二 均衡策略分析
第四节 本章小结
第三章 基于代表性消费者模型的不确定研发研究第一节 引言
第二节 增加保留价格型产品创新模型一 模型求解
二 均衡比较静态分析
第三节 社会最优研发策略分析一 确定研发成果
二 确定风险
三 比较静态分析
第四节 私人最优和社会最优策略比较分析一 研发成果比较
二 风险策略比较
第五节 工序创新对增加保留价格型产品创新的影响一 模型假设
二 均衡策略分析
第六节 本章小结
第四章 增加产品差异化型研发创新模型第一节 引言
第二节 增加产品差异化型研发创新模型一 模型假设
二 均衡策略分析
三 社会最优研发策略
第三节 工序创新对增加差异化型产品创新影响分析一 模型假设
二 均衡策略分析
第四节 增加差异化型产品创新对工序创新影响分析一 模型假设
二 均衡策略分析
第五节 本章小结
第五章 基于纵向差异化模型的工序和产品创新研究——市场完全覆盖情形第一节 引言
第二节 基于纵向差异化模型的工序和产品创新模型
第三节 工序创新和质量选择同时进行的情形一 均衡求解
二 比较静态分析
第四节 先工序创新后质量选择模型一 均衡求解
二 比较静态分析
第五节 先质量选择后工序创新模型一 价格竞争阶段
二 工序创新阶段
三 质量选择阶段
第六节 本章小结
第六章 基于纵向差异化模型的工序和产品创新研究——市场部分覆盖情形第一节 引言
第二节 基于纵向差异化模型的工序和产品创新模型
第三节 先质量选择后工序创新模型一 变量质量成本情形
二 固定质量成本情形
第四节 先工序创新后质量选择模型一 变量质量成本情形
二 固定质量成本情形
第五节 本章小结